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We point out some major drawbaks in random trading market models and
propose a realisti modiation whih overomes suh drawbaks through
`sensible trading'. We apply suh trading poliy in dierent situations: a)
Agents with zero saving fator b) with onstant saving fator and ) with
random saving fator in all the ases the riher agents seem to follow power
laws in terms of their wealth (money) distribution whih support Pareto's
observation.
Introdution
Pareto power law [1℄ in wealth distribution has beome a hot topi nowadays. Sine last
deade physiists are putting a lot of eorts to study eonomi market through suitable
models [2, 3, 4, 5℄. They onsider eonomi market as a multi-agent interating system
and try to analyze the market through known tools of statistial physis although in
reality the eonomi market is muh more omplex and the agents are inherently dierent
from eah otherso annot be hoped to behave similarly. To start with, a losed eonomy
market has been onsidered having some money exhange interation the main intention
is to nd out the distribution of wealth (money) among the agents and to searh for a
suitable exhange interation whih an produe Pareto like power law distribution of
wealth.
Random trading market
The moleules in an ideal gas interat freely and the kineti theory nds the energy
distribution among the moleules. If the agents of model market exhange their money
through suh free interations that market is alled a random trading market [2℄. Two
types of basi random trading are possible:
1
Type-I trading
Two interating agents (i and j) put all their money (mi and mj) together. Then one
agent takes a random part of the total money and rest money goes to other agent.
total = mi +mj = m
′
i +m
′
j
m′i = ǫ× total; m
′
j = total −m
′
i
with 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1
Here agents do not save anything and put all their money for trading. This type of
trading rule results [2℄ Gibbs distribution of the money distribution in the market at
steady state having the form:
P (m) ∼ e−m/T
where T is the average money (total money/total agent) of the market. Clearly this
distribution is similar to the energy distribution within the moleules of ideal gas. If the
agents do save some portions (xed or random) of their money then the total money
available for random trading gets redued. We an write the general money exhange
rule for two agents having money mi and mj and saving fators si and sj respetively:
total = mi +mj
(tot)av = mi(1− si) +mj(1− sj)
m′i = (mi × si) + ǫ× (tot)av ; m
′
j = total −m
′
i
For xed saving fator (si = sj = s) we get a most probable type money distribution
[2, 4℄ and for random saving fator (0 ≤ si ≤ 1) the money distribution shows [5℄ Pareto
power law with exponent −2.
Type-II trading
Another type of trading may our [3℄ when two interating agents put same amount of
money for random exhange i.e, the riher agent put an amount just equal to that of the
poor agent. Then as before one agent takes a random part of the total money (available
for trading) and rest money goes to other agent.
total = mi +mj = m
′
i +m
′
j
If mi < mj
(tot)av = 2×mi
2
m′i = ǫ× (tot)av ; m
′
j = total −m
′
i
If mi ≥ mj
(tot)av = 2×mj
m′j = ǫ× (tot)av ; m
′
i = total −m
′
j
We an generalize the above sheme for two agents (i and j) with saving fators si and
sj as
total = mi +mj ;
If mi < mj
(tot)av = 2×mi(1− si)
m′i = (mi × si) + ǫ× (tot)av ; m
′
j = total −m
′
i
If mi ≥ mj
(tot)av = 2×mj(1− sj)
m′j = (mj × sj) + ǫ× (tot)av; m
′
i = total −m
′
j
Major drawbaks
In Type-I trading
1) The random exhange in Type-I trading market reates `inseurity ' problem. Here
riher agents put more money (beyond saving) to trade with poor agents even with
agents having no money. Therefore the riher agent always nds greater probability to
loose than to gain from an exhange interation. It may happen that the riher agent
looses all his money in one interation. Thus Type-I trading favors the poor agents and
it is really a nightmare to the riher agents.
2) Type-I trading shows Pareto power law when the agents have random saving fator
drawn from an interval 0 ≤ si ≤ 1. But there is one important restrition that the
interval has to inludes the value 1 (or very nearly 1). If we take an interval 0 ≤ si ≤ 0.8
-there will not be any robust power law that means some agents with very high saving
fator have to be present in the market who always gain money from the interations
and do not loose. Therefore to ahieve Pareto power law this model pre-assigned some
agents as permanent gainer whih weakens the model itself.
3
In Type-II trading
Although Type-II trading seems realisti, it has a basi problem that it gradually tends
toward `monopoly ' market where all money goes to a single agent making all others
simply beggar. This happens beause when one agent losses all his money he annot take
part in further money exhange as he does not aord some money for trade. Thus the
agents having `zero' money remain `outast' from the soiety and their number inreases
as the interations go on.
The `sensible trading' sheme
We propose a `sensible trading' sheme among the agents to avoid the aforesaid draw-
baks. This is a mixture of Type-I and Type-II trading: Interations follow Type-II
trading with a probability p and obey Type-I trading with probability (1− p). Thus the
general money exhange sheme for this `sensible' trading appears as:
total = mi +mj = m
′
i +m
′
j
For r ≤ p
(tot)av = mi(1− si) +mj(1− sj)
m′i = (mi × si) + ǫ× (tot)av ; m
′
j = total −m
′
i
For r > p
If mi < mj
(tot)av = 2×mi(1− si)
m′i = (mi × si) + ǫ× (tot)av ; m
′
j = total −m
′
i
If mi ≥ mj
(tot)av = 2×mj(1− sj)
m′j = (mj × sj) + ǫ× (tot)av; m
′
i = total −m
′
j
Here r is a random number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Clearly when
p = 0 only Type-I trading is possible and when p = 1 we will have Type-II trading only.
Therefore we an reprodue Type-I and Type-II tradings orretly from this generalized
`sensible trading' sheme. The behavior of this sheme beomes interesting when p value
lies in between the above extremes so that both Type-I and Type-II tradings play their
role. We all it a `sensible market' where Type-II trading dominates muh over Type-I
trading beause Type-II has no extra risk. We observe that for p > 0.9 -the market
seems to approah toward `monopoly trend' and for p ≤ 0.5 Type-I trading dominates
resulting Gibbs-like free-market. Therefore we keep p values in the range 0.5 < p ≤ 0.9
to have a `sensible market'.
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Let us disuss how does this sheme overome the drawbaks:
1) Here the riher agents feel seured as in most of the ases they apt Type-II trading
with poor agents and there is no risk to loose more.
2) If some agents loose all their money still they an interat with others through
Type-I trading (with 1 − p probability) and an gain money to beome riher. This
resists the `monopoly ' trend and drives the system toward a steady state.
Now we are going to nd (numerially) the money distributions following `sensible
trading' sheme in dierent situations. We hoose two p values: p = 0.8 and p = 0.9
to make the market more sensitive. Also we hoose number of agents N = 100 and the
average money T = 100 and number of interations = 5000000 in eah ase.
Agents have no saving fator
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Fig. 1: The dotted straight lines represents power laws with exponents −0.8 and −4 re-
spetively. The urved dotted line is the plot of exp(−m/T ). Averages are taken over 4000
samples.
Without any saving fator the `sensible' market shows two power laws and demands
that the poor agents and the riher agents obey dierent power law behavior. The
deviation of the distribution funtion from the free market (Gibbs law) is prominent.
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Agents have onstant saving fator (s)
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Fig. 2: The dotted straight line in rst plot represents exp(−m/T ) and in seond plot
presents power laws with exponents −0.7 and −4 respetively. Averages are taken over 1000
samples.
In Gibbs like free market onstant saving fator results most probable type distribution.
But in the sensible market we observe that for low saving fator the distributions almost
follow exponential laws and this exponential behavior deviates (some power laws appear)
as we inrease p values. On the other hand for high saving fator the most probable type
distributions appear.
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Agents have random saving fator (si)
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Fig. 3: In the rst plot we take 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 and in seond and third plot that range has been
redued to 0 ≤ si ≤ 0.8. The dotted lines represent power laws having dierent exponents: in
rst plot −0.8 and −2, in seond plot −0.4 and in third plot −0.8 and −5. Averages are taken
over 1000 samples.
For random saving ase we nd two distint power laws when the random fator is
hosen from the interval 0 ≤ si ≤ 1. Also the market shows power law distribution with
redued range of random fator (0 ≤ si ≤ 0.8) as p value inreases.
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Conlusions
A free market (Type-I trading) basially runs through `gambling' and a restrited market
(Type-II trading) gradually beomes a `monopoly ' market. But a areful mixing of Type-I
and Type-II trading an produe a muh realisti model of losed market. Suh a market
shows power law behavior in terms of wealth (money) distribution within agents for
dierent situations of money exhange therefore potentially advaned.
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